The 2005 Formula 1 season is etched in motorsport history for numerous reasons, but one event stands out with stark infamy: the United States Grand Prix at Indianapolis. A race weekend marred by unprecedented tyre safety concerns culminated in one of the most controversial races in the sport’s history. The question on many fans’ lips then, and even now, is: how many cars took part in the 2005 F1 US Grand Prix? The answer is a mere six, a shockingly low number compared to the usual grid of twenty. This article delves into the dramatic events that led to only six cars starting the race, exploring the tyre controversy that shook Formula 1 to its core.
The 2005 season had already seen rule changes, notably the mandate of a single set of tyres for both qualifying and the race. This regulation put pressure on tyre manufacturers Bridgestone and Michelin. While Michelin teams, including McLaren, Renault, Williams, and Toyota, initially seemed to adapt better, problems began to surface as the F1 circus arrived at the iconic Indianapolis Motor Speedway.
Friday, June 17th: The First Warning Signs
The trouble began on Friday during the practice sessions. Ricardo Zonta, Toyota’s third driver, experienced a left rear Michelin tyre failure, causing a spin. Initially, this incident was dismissed as minor. However, the situation escalated dramatically when Ralf Schumacher suffered a massive crash in FP2. Exiting Turn 13, the high-speed banked corner leading onto the pit straight, Ralf’s Toyota speared into the wall. The cause was immediately suspected to be a left rear tyre failure.
John Howett, Toyota’s Team Principal at the time, recounted the unfolding events: “Ralf’s was a fairly big shunt, and we were all relieved that he got out of the car. They were replaying pictures of the incident, and it looked like the left rear tyre had gone down.” Further inspection revealed alarming signs even on Jarno Trulli’s car. “When Jarno [Trulli] came in there were what looked like vertical cuts in the sidewall of the rear left. So we knew we had a problem.”
The initial focus was on Toyota, with Michelin initially suspecting low tyre pressures. However, Toyota refuted this, confirming they were running pressures within the recommended range. The problem proved to be more widespread than first imagined.
Howett continued, “One of the Michelin guys came along and said they had identified a similar situation to Jarno’s in three or four other teams. So an hour or so after FP2 it became obvious that there was an issue with the tyre.” Michelin convened an emergency meeting, acknowledging a serious tyre problem and initiating overnight investigations to understand the root cause, initially suspecting a batch issue.
Saturday, June 18th: The Crisis Deepens
By Saturday morning, the news from Michelin’s headquarters in Clermont-Ferrand was grim. The issue was not a simple batch problem but a fundamental design flaw exposed by the unique demands of the Indianapolis banking.
Howett explained the technical explanation provided by Michelin: “There was a wave created in the sidewall as you go around the banking. And it was a question of the frequency of that wave relative to the design of the tyre – it’s like those old suspension bridges when the wind blows, and the frequency is right, and they just fall apart. If you have a vertical load at the same time with that frequency, the tyre is very fragile, because of this harmonic wave.” Michelin believed that the Toyota chassis and suspension characteristics might have exacerbated this “harmonic wave” phenomenon, making them particularly vulnerable, although they admitted it wasn’t solely a Toyota issue.
Charlie Whiting, the FIA race director, corroborated Michelin’s analysis in a later interview: “They came to us and said we’ve got too much loading, we’ve got these standing waves on the tyres. The sidewall started to buckle, that’s what the prognosis was.”
Michelin advised its partner teams to take precautionary measures during Saturday practice. This included running higher tyre pressures, minimizing practice laps, and running with lighter fuel loads to reduce stress on the tyres. Qualifying saw Jarno Trulli surprisingly take pole position, but there was a palpable sense of unease and uncertainty hanging over the Michelin teams.
Whiting highlighted a critical underlying issue: the “back-up tyre” strategy. Tyre manufacturers were supposed to provide a prime tyre and a safer back-up option. However, the “back-up” had evolved into an “option” tyre, often pushing performance limits rather than serving as a reliable safety net. Michelin’s prime tyre was failing, and they lacked a suitable alternative readily available.
The idea of modifying the circuit with a chicane emerged as a potential solution. A chicane had been hastily implemented at the 1994 Spanish Grand Prix under similar emergency circumstances, giving teams hope for a precedent.
Howett described the proposal: “The proposal then to Bernie Ecclestone and (Indy boss) Tony George was we should look to putting a chicane in before Turn 13 to slow the cars down.” Bernie Ecclestone and Tony George seemed receptive initially, and the Michelin teams operated under the assumption that a chicane would be installed overnight. They even offered to race without points to ensure a race could take place.
However, Charlie Whiting and FIA president Max Mosley swiftly rejected the chicane proposal, citing safety and regulatory concerns. Whiting emphasized, “I’m responsible for the safety of the circuit, the circuit is homologated in a certain configuration, without doing proper simulations I’m not going to say, ‘Let’s just put a chicane in there.'”
As a last-ditch effort, 26 suspect tyres were flown to Michelin’s research facility in Akron, Ohio, accompanied by FIA technical delegate Jo Bauer. Despite rigorous testing, the overnight trip yielded no new insights, proving to be a fruitless endeavor.
Sunday, June 19th: The Race That Wasn’t
Sunday dawned without a chicane or any resolution. Michelin convened a series of increasingly tense meetings. Legal ramifications and the prospect of no race loomed large.
Howett described the tense atmosphere: “Bernie came and Charlie came. The Bridgestone teams were invited, but Ferrari didn’t come… Flavio [Briatore] was getting hot and bothered, and Ron.”
The FIA offered counter-proposals, including lifting the tyre change ban or imposing speed restrictions for Michelin cars in Turn 13. However, these were deemed impractical or unsafe by the Michelin teams and drivers. Drivers felt speed limiting through a banked corner was inherently risky.
Tony George, President of Indianapolis Motor Speedway, was caught in the middle: “I was in meetings with team principals and Formula One Management, listening mainly. I had Max on the phone at one point and there was a whole discussion about what we’re accustomed to, and that’s trying to have the show go on and give the fans what they paid to see.”
Whiting remained firm in his stance against a chicane, even under immense pressure from the Michelin teams: “They started to say you’ve got to do this, there won’t be a race otherwise. I said there isn’t going to be a chicane, you make your minds up, I’ll be in my office if you want me.”
Further compromise suggestions from the FIA, such as running Michelin cars through the pit lane each lap or implementing a speed limit only for Michelin cars while allowing Bridgestone cars to race at full speed, were also rejected by Michelin teams as unsatisfactory and against the spirit of racing.
Despite Whiting’s firm rejection, instructions were bizarrely given to begin constructing a chicane, apparently on Bernie Ecclestone’s direction. Whiting intervened immediately, threatening to withdraw FIA sanctioning of the race if any circuit modifications were made without proper homologation.
George confirmed the chaotic situation: “We were ready to do what we needed to do, build the chicane. But ultimately it was decided that wasn’t an acceptable solution. I don’t recall if Bernie had authorised it or not – it was all subject to getting hold of Max, as I recall. I think Charlie’s opinion was, reading the rules and interpreting them literally, that it was not an option.”
Michelin, faced with no acceptable solution and a significant safety risk, made the difficult decision to instruct its partner teams to withdraw from the race. The teams, despite wanting to race for the fans, ultimately prioritized driver safety.
Jean Todt, Ferrari’s team boss, saw no reason to compromise, refusing to agree to any circuit modifications that would disadvantage his Bridgestone-shod team. Attempts to negotiate with Todt and Max Mosley proved futile.
Pat Symonds, Renault’s Chief Engineer at the time, summed up the safety imperative: “Safety comes first, end of story. When you get standing waves in a tyre, the only things that affect it are load, speed and pressure. We were at the highest pressures we could run, so you had to reduced load and speed. We couldn’t do that. But the chicane shouldn’t have happened, it’s sport, it’s not about bringing everything down to the lowest common denominator. If you can’t perform, you can’t perform.”
The Michelin teams collectively decided to withdraw. Fernando Alonso, then a championship contender, described the chaotic atmosphere: “It was very a strange weekend with the problems of the tyres, many discussions, many meetings in different motorhomes, trying to come to an agreement of racing but maybe not taking the points, or some kind of decision to make everyone happy. In the end it was not possible, which I think was a shame for the people, because the show was affected by that decision.”
The Michelin teams, contractually obligated to appear, completed the formation lap. Then, in a coordinated move, fourteen cars – representing Renault, McLaren, Williams, Toyota, Red Bull, Sauber, and BAR-Honda – peeled into the pit lane, leaving only the six Bridgestone-equipped cars on the grid. These were the two Ferraris, two Jordans, and two Minardis.
Jacques Villeneuve of Sauber expressed his frustration: “The most frustrating thing was that at the time Ferrari and the FIA would not accept that we change the course, even though we would give them all the points. They didn’t want to play the game and think about the good of the sport. It’s not like we could have done anything. No Michelin cars would have finished the race, we would have all ended up in the wall there. It was just not possible.”
The race began with only six cars, a surreal and deeply disappointing spectacle for the fans in attendance.
The Race and Aftermath
The 2005 United States Grand Prix proceeded with just six cars. Michael Schumacher led Rubens Barrichello to a Ferrari 1-2 finish, with Tiago Monteiro in a Jordan completing the podium. It was a hollow victory for Ferrari, their only win in a season dominated by Michelin-equipped cars.
The crowd’s reaction was visceral and negative. Whiting described the scene: “My goodness, the crowd opposite, when I climbed down off the start platform, you should have heard the boos. It was horrendous… what really worried me was when they started throwing beer cans onto the track at the first corner.”
The fallout from the 2005 US Grand Prix was significant. Michelin, while not penalized by the FIA as they were not a competitor, agreed to a compensation package, including subsidizing tickets for the 2006 race. The Michelin teams faced a World Motor Sport Council hearing and were found guilty of failing to provide suitable tyres and wrongfully refusing to start the race, but with mitigating circumstances acknowledged.
Legal actions followed, with teams facing class action lawsuits from disgruntled fans. However, legal advice suggested that the teams had acted responsibly by prioritizing safety and withdrawing from a potentially dangerous race.
Tony George reflected on the aftermath: “We didn’t know what the fallout would be. But it we knew it would probably be great. In some of the litigation that followed we were concerned about who was going to step up to the table here, and share in some of the responsibility. And to their credit Michelin went a long way into trying to make it right, and allow us to come back the next year.”
In conclusion, the 2005 United States Grand Prix remains a stark reminder of the critical importance of tyre safety in Formula 1. Only six cars, all running on Bridgestone tyres, ultimately participated in the race, a direct consequence of Michelin’s tyre safety concerns and the ensuing controversy. The event profoundly impacted the sport’s image and highlighted the complex interplay of safety, competition, and regulations in Formula 1.
